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Demographic Determinants
of Population Aging
in Europe since 1850
MICHAEL MURPHY
POPULATION AGING is a key feature of twenty-first-century demographic
trends. Projections by the United Nations suggest that by 2100 in Europe,
people aged 65 and over are expected to form about 30 percent of the pop-
ulation, and more than one person in eight will be aged 80 or older (United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). Given that mor-
tality declines are expected to continue, responses to population aging have
included advocating policies to stimulate both fertility and immigration.
Mortality improvement has sometimes been presented as the primary
driver of long-term population aging since it is the driver of individuals’ ag-
ing. However, since the determinants of population aging became a topic of
study from the 1950s (e.g. Valaoras 1950; Coale 1956; United Nations 1956),
primacy has usually been given to fertility decline. According to Coale, “one
can say with every confidence of being correct that a lower course of fer-
tility produces an older population than would a higher course, all other
factors being the same; and with fair confidence that most mortality im-
provements in the past have produced a younger population than would
have resulted from unchanged mortality” (Coale 1956, p. 114). While this
conclusion remains the standard view, mortality improvement is now rec-
ognized as an increasingly important factor in population aging, especially
in low-fertility societies where the majority of the world’s population now
live (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). This
is because mortality improvement at older ages has become substantial, es-
pecially from the middle of the twentieth century (Bongaarts and Bulatao
2000). The effect of migration on population aging is generally regarded
as minor in most situations (United Nations Department of Economic and
Social Affairs 1973; Goldstein 2009; Murphy 2016a).
The conclusion that fertility decline has been the most important fac-
tor in population aging in high-income countries is widely accepted. This
is consistent with a stylized demographic transition model in which fer-
tility and mortality are initially broadly constant over time with popula-
tion growth close to zero and there is no change in age structure. Subse-
quent mortality improvement is initially concentrated at younger ages, both
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because it was easier to reduce mortality at these ages and because a large
fraction of these populations were young. Together with a tendency for fer-
tility to increase around the start of fertility transition (Dyson and Murphy
1985), this tends to make population structures younger. In the next phase,
this rejuvenation effect is more than offset by subsequent fertility decline,
and populations start to age. At a later stage, mortality improvement occurs
mainly at older ages and reinforces aging arising from fertility decline. Fi-
nally, in high-income countries when fertility has been relatively constant
at low levels for an extended period of time and mortality improvement
continues, mortality change comes to dominate population aging. The for-
mal dynamics of how population structures evolve under changing fertility
and mortality was further developed by Coale (1972) and Lee (1994) and
by Chesnais (1990), who provided estimates of age-structure changes with
a stylized demographic transition change model.
Empirical evidence for the dominant role of fertility is surprisingly thin,
especially for quantifying the relative importance of fertility and mortality.
Conclusions are still often based on static models such as those of Coale
(1956), supplemented by a small number of studies of counterfactual pop-
ulation projections starting from earlier time points, typically comparing ac-
tual values with projections using constant fertility or mortality rates from
the chosen baseline (e.g. Hermalin 1966). This approach was recently used
by Bengtsson and Scott (2011) for Sweden, assuming constant fertility over
the twentieth century. The authors concluded that “the primary cause of
population aging in Sweden up to now was, as elsewhere, declining fertil-
ity” and that declining mortality became influential only in the last decades
of the twentieth century (Bengtsson and Scott 2011, p. 259). Counterfactual
population projections remain a keymethod for analyzing the determinants
of aging (Lee and Zhou 2017).
Neither a simple demographic transition model nor long-term fixed
fertility and mortality regimes that underpin stable population and popula-
tion projection models are observed in practice. Conclusions are principally
deductive: what happens when fertility and mortality vary in stable pop-
ulation models is demonstrated, and a similar response is expected in the
real world. These approaches provide qualitative conclusions rather than
quantifying the contribution of fertility and mortality to population aging.1
As a challenge to this orthodoxy, Preston, Himes, and Eggers (1989)
analyzed factors associated with population aging in the United States and
Sweden in the period 1980–1985. They concluded that mortality improve-
ment was the main driver of population aging at this time. Their analysis
was based on an innovative approach, referred to subsequently as the PHE
model (initials referring to authors’ names), that decomposes changes in
population aging into births, mortality, and net migration. A similar con-
clusion on the importance of mortality for population aging was reached
by Caselli and Vallin (1990) by comparing actual and projected population
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trends in France and Italy over the period 1960–2040. Preston and Stokes
(2012, p. 231), using the PHE model to investigate sources of population
aging in the period 2005–10, concluded that “in more developed countries,
the massive improvements in survivorship from one birth cohort to the
next have been the most important source of aging.” They attribute over
four fifths (82 percent) of population aging in more developed countries
(excluding Eastern Europe) to inter-cohort mortality change in this recent
period.
These various results, based on different approaches, are not neces-
sarily inconsistent with the standard model set out above, since they are
confined to the most recent period. My focus here is on population aging
as a long-term process across multiple countries. In what follows, I sum-
marize the PHE method used to estimate the contribution of fertility, mor-
tality, and migration to population aging in Europe and describe the data
from the Human Mortality Database used to fit the PHE model; use mean
population age as an index of population aging compared with alternative
indicators and extend the PHE approach to include parental fertility as an
explicit variable in the model; apply the PHE approach over an extended
period beginning in 1850 to 11 European countries to provide estimates of
the demographic determinants of population aging for over a century in
Europe (excluding Eastern Europe); and discuss how this approach pro-
vides a clearer understanding of the drivers of population aging over the
past 150 years and consider the implications of these findings for the future.
Methods, data, and models
The Preston, Himes, and Eggers (PHE) method
The approach developed in Preston, Himes, and Eggers (1989) is based on
earlier work on age-specific growth rates (Horiuchi and Preston 1988) aris-
ing from development of the Preston–Coale synthesis model (Preston and
Coale 1982). The decomposition allocates overall population changes over
time into those due to fertility, mortality, and migration as follows:
P (a, t ) = B (t − a) exp
(∫ a
0
{−μ(x, t − x) + m(x, t − x)} dx
)
(1)
where for age a at time t: P(a,t) is population, μ(a,t) is the force of mortality,
m(a,t) is the net migration rate, and B(t) is the number of births.
PHE can be summarized by noting that the annual change in popula-
tion numbers in a particular year at a given age is simply the difference at
that age between numbers alive at the start and end of that year. The num-
bers alive are determined by the size of the birth cohort they are drawn
from, with allowance for mortality and migration in the intervening period
using equation (1).
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Let r(a,t) denote (∂P(a, t )/∂t ) / P(a, t ), the proportional rate of growth
of P(a, t ). This rate is found by taking the logarithm of both sides of equation
(1) and differentiating with respect to time. I thereby obtain
r (a, t ) = ∂B(t − a)
∂t
/B(t − a) −
∫ a
0
∂μ(x, t − x)
∂t
dx +
∫ a
0
∂m(x, t − x)
∂t
dx
(2)
The first term on the right is the rate of growth of births at time t − a. The
second and third terms are the rates of change in subsequent cohort sur-
vival and lifetime net migration. The average age of these changes at time
t uniquely decomposes the change in population mean age to those due
to births, survival probability, and net migration of adjacent cohorts in the
period. Population aging occurs when the population distribution shifts to-
ward older ages. This may be measured by the first derivative of mean pop-
ulation age in continuous formulation or as the annual change in discrete
form. Although change in mean age of a population is not a commonly used
indicator of population aging, median age is widely used (e.g. United Na-
tions Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). I justify the use of
mean age when considering alternative indicators of aging later.
Since my interest is in long-term changes, I sum the annual values
to show the cumulative effect of fertility, mortality, and migration over ex-
tended time intervals. I present data looking backward in time from the
latest available date to various start dates. This form of presentation does
not give special status to a possibly arbitrary start date some years in the
past.
I use the following notation for the cumulative effect of the birth co-
hort, mortality, and migration terms of equation (1): MeanAge[t1, t2] is the
change in overall mean age between years t1 and t2, and analogously for the
other components. The decomposition of mean age can thus be written:
MeanAge[t1, t2] = Births[t1, t2] + Survival[t1, t2]
+NetMigration[t1, t2] (3)
This formula may be extended if the terms in equation (1) are fur-
ther decomposed multiplicatively. For example, births may be expressed as
the product of total population size and crude birth rate. If so, one can re-
place Births[t1, t2] by Population[t1, t2] + CBR[t1, t2] in equation (3).
This point is developed in more detail later. These data may be shown as
values in 5-year intervals for comparison with results of Preston, Himes,
and Eggers (1989) and Preston and Stokes (2012).
Period changes in population mean age are decomposed into changes
in three components: births, cohort survival, and lifetime net migration.
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The last two are functions of age-specific mortality and net migration rates.
However, the PHE model does not include fertility explicitly. The first com-
ponent in the PHE model is the number of births rather than fertility rates;
the latter are used as the basis of stable population and population projec-
tion models that have been the main approaches to date for investigating
the contribution of fertility and mortality to population aging. The direct ef-
fect of mortality improvement experienced by older cohorts at any age will
lead to population aging, and improvement among younger cohorts has the
opposite effect, ceteris paribus, in the immediate future. However, lives saved
in the past at young ages will lead to more potential parents and possibly
additional subsequent births; this indirect effect may offset population aging.
Thus, for example, infant mortality levels 80 years ago will directly affect
the current number of 80-year-olds, but those levels are also likely to affect
the number of births to this group as parents when they were aged 20–40—
about 40–60 years ago—and therefore indirectly to affect the size of later
birth cohorts. The same point holds for migration since it is of the same form
as mortality in equation (1) (Murphy 2016b).2
Depending on the age of an individual, only mortality and migration
rates for periods up to about 100 years earlier directly influence population
numbers according to equation (1). However, rates in this period as well as
earlier ones will also have an indirect effect on the population distribution
by affecting cohort size and therefore the number of potential parents and
the cohort size of their offspring. Thus the current population distribution
depends on rates stretching back for unlimited periods in the past. In prac-
tice, the effect of earlier rates becomes attenuated so that the current dis-
tribution is insensitive to rates more than a few generations earlier (Arthur
1982), although the converse is that more recent rates are highly influential
and need to be included and analyzed appropriately. It is not possible, how-
ever, to separate the influence of the three components (births, survival,
migration) through the indirect pathways without additional information
or assumptions.
The calculation of mean population age in a given year depends on the
numbers in each cohort alive at that time given by equation (1), which is
determined by the birth cohort size a years earlier and rates in the previous
a years up to a maximum of 110 years in our case. High proportions sur-
viving to older ages mean that these people contribute substantially to the
mean age of the population and therefore to trends in population aging. The
number of survivors of cohorts born around 80 years earlier is influential,
but the number of centenarians is small, so these cohorts contribute little
to the estimates of mean ages.
A limitation of the PHE approach is that equation (1) requires detailed
demographic rates for a century or so before the first change in mean age
can be calculated. This is one reason why estimates to date are based on
short-term comparisons, typically five years and only for recent periods,
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although population aging is intrinsically determined by much longer time
scales than are other demographic developments (Chesnais 1990).
On the other hand, the PHE approach is an accounting method that
requires no assumptions.3 It uniquely allocates changes in population aging
to the three components. The PHE method is transitive, that is, the change
in each of the components of equation (3) between times t1 and t2 is simply
the value between times t1 and an intermediate time t3 plus the value be-
tween t3 and t2. Results do not depend on decisions about the period over
which analysis is undertaken or the choice of baseline year, and it produces
meaningful results over arbitrarily long time scales.
Human Mortality Database
The PHE approach requires detailed cohort mortality and net migration
rates and annual numbers of births over an extended period. Data can be
drawn from the Human Mortality Database (HMD), which includes esti-
mates of mortality rates and population size by single year of age and sex
for each calendar year, together with information on total annual num-
bers of births and deaths. These estimates are constructed using a uniform
method applied to information from validated official statistics such as cen-
suses, vital registration, and population estimates (Wilmoth et al. 2007;
HumanMortality Database 2016). Since I am interested in long-term trends,
I confine attention to countries with well over 100 years of continuous data:
five Nordic countries, five from Western Europe, and one from Southern
Europe (see Table 1). These countries account for just over half of the total
population size of Northern, Western, and Southern Europe as defined by
the United Nations. Most have data available from 1850, so I present most
results from that year or from 1900, apart from Sweden which starts at
1751. I also construct an overall European value for the period 1850–2012
based on an average of available country values weighted by population
size.
Cohort life tables from age zero to the age reached by the last available
year (or age 110 if reached earlier) are available for some cohorts in HMD
(Table 1). For other cohorts, I derivedmy own life tables. As cohortmortality
rates are available for earlier cohorts, I constructed partial life tables for these
cohorts from the age that the cohort reached at the start year up to age 110.
Cohort mortality rates are also available for later cohorts up to around 1980,
so I constructed cohort life tables to the age reached at the last available year
for these cohorts. For those born after about 1980, only period mortality
rates are available, so I calculated approximate cohort life tables for those
born in year t using mortality rates for age 0 in year t, age 1 in year t+1 etc.
up to the latest available year. Net migration, m(a,t), is calculated using the
balancing equation since population size and estimates of expected deaths
to the cohort are available at age a and time t.
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I extend the model to include explicit consideration of fertility later.
Because annual information on age-specific fertility is not available over
the extended period for which mortality data are available, I estimate fertil-
ity rates as follows. The distribution of age-specific fertility rates f(a), with∑
a f (a) = 1, is assumed to be given by a beta distribution, β(2.7,2.7), scaled
to be between ages 15 and 45, with a mean of 30 years and standard devi-
ation of 6 years. This is a typical fertility pattern for populations over this
period.
The actual number of births in year t, B(t), is therefore given by:
B(t ) = k(t )aP(a, t ) f (a)
where, as before, P(a,t) is the population aged a in year t. This provides
an estimate of k(t), the level of fertility in year t, as the expected number
of children per adult with the given fertility distribution, and k(t)f(a) as the
age-specific fertility rates. From these values I derive estimates of TFR, GRR,
NRR etc.
This indirect standardization method is similar to that of Calot and
Sardón (2001), with the standard population being that of a typical fertile
population. I use the schedule for populations with both sexes combined
rather than just for women as in most applications, but this makes no differ-
ence to the substantive conclusions (Keilman, Tymicki, and Skirbekk 2014).
For further details of the method see Murphy (2016a).
Results
Comparison of indexes of aging
Because change in population mean age is not a commonly used indicator
of population aging, I need to establish that the choice of indicator does not
lead to differences in interpretation of the contribution of fertility and mor-
tality to population aging. I start by comparing it with twomore widely used
indicators of population aging—proportion of people aged 65 or over and
median age—both of which are available for all countries from the United
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2015).
These three indicators show almost identical trends in the 11 European
countries chosen (see Figure 1: note that the averages and percentage series
are shown with different numerical scales), so use of alternative indicators
does not explain the different interpretations of the determinants of popu-
lation aging. Mean age has more general advantages as a summary statistic:
it is sensitive to the value of every observation; it gives more weight to ob-
servations at the extremes of the age distribution; and it is directly linked to
the wider set of statistical indicators such as covariance with age that arise
in the formulation of the PHE model (Chu 1997; Vaupel and Canudis Romo
2002).
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TABLE 2 Summary of correlations between alternative indicators of
population aging, overall European series 1850–present
Mean Median Prop. 65+
(a) European series: correlation coefficients
Mean — 0.996 0.989
Median 0.957 — 0.977
Prop. 65+ 0.908 0.784 —
(b) All countries: mean and (standard deviation)
Mean — 0.990 (0.008) 0.974 (0.015)
Median 0.927 (0.030) — 0.946 (0.034)
Prop. 65+ 0.720 (0.179) 0.553 (0.268) —
NOTES: European series covers years 1850–2012. All countries includes unweighted averages of the
11 individual countries over periods of data availability shown in Table 1. Pearson correlation coefficients
(shaded) and partial correlation coefficients after control for year.
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of Human Mortality Database.
In the period from 1850, the overall mean age increased by about 13
years, from 28 to 41 years, and the proportions aged 65 and over by 12
percentage points, from 5 percent to 17 percent (Table 1). Often starting in
the nineteenth century, population aging accelerated from the early twen-
tieth century. A broadly similar pattern of aging is observed in all countries,
with some variations. France exhibits a generally linear trend over time,
while Italy shows sharp acceleration at the end of the period. The small-
est increases are observed in Sweden, France, and Iceland, countries with
very different demographic histories, suggesting that different factors are
responsible for similar outcomes. Table 2 presents Pearson and partial cor-
relation coefficients, with allowance for a linear time trend, between the
three series for all countries from 1850 (or the first available year if later) to
the last available year. Mean age is correlated at 0.99 with both median age
and proportion aged 65 and over for the overall European series, slightly
higher than the correlation between the median and proportion aged 65
and over. The average correlation coefficients of the mean with the other
two variables for the 11 individual countries over the period are 0.99 and
0.97 respectively. The values are somewhat smaller for the partial correla-
tion coefficients, but average values for mean age are below 0.9 only for the
partial correlation with proportion aged 65 and over.
Sensitivity of estimates to start year
In order to apply equation (1) in a given year, estimates of birth cohort
numbers, mortality, and migration for a century or so before that year are
required. Accordingly, I would be able to make estimates only from about
a century after the initial date of Table 1, long after the aging process had
started in Europe. I therefore make the following assumptions between the
mid-eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to extend estimates back to the
mid-nineteenth century:
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(i) Mortality was similar to that of the initial year for which data are avail-
able.
(ii) Net migration was close to zero before the initial year.
With these assumptions, births a years before the initial year, T, can be
estimated, by reverse survival as
B(T − a) = P(a, T ) /exp
(
−
∫ a
0
μ (x, T ) dx
)
.
The key question is whether the results obtained with these major as-
sumptions are substantially different from values using full information
for the whole period. I assess their validity in two ways. First, I consider
whether they are reasonable given our knowledge of historical trends.
Mortality showed more improvement in Sweden from the mid-eighteenth
to the mid-nineteenth century than in England and Wales and France,
but all of these changes were small compared to those in later periods
(HumanMortality Database 2016; Wrigley and Schofield 1981; Vallin 1991;
Lee 2003). Thus, the assumption that mortality was approximately constant
appears reasonable.
International migration in Western Europe was less common between
the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries than in later periods.
Large-scale intercontinental migration started only from the second half
of the nineteenth century when an estimated 55 million Europeans left
for the Americas and Australasia between then and 1910 (Hatton and
Williamson 1998; Baines 1995; Cohn 2011). However, these studies do not
include intra-European migration, for which there is some information
from national censuses and other sources before the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury. Numbers of emigrants in six of the countries included here that are
located around the North Sea—Denmark, England, Netherlands, Norway,
Scotland and Sweden—are available (van Lottum 2007, Table 5.1). The
overall proportions living abroad per 1,000 population, 5 in 1800 and 15 in
1850 compared with 54 in 1900, suggest that intra-Europeanmigration was
also relatively uncommon and that levels were particularly small between
the mid-eighteenth and mid-nineteenth centuries. In more recent periods,
assumptions of both stability in mortality and negligible net migration are
clearly less valid than before 1850.
The second approach to appraising assumptions (i) and (ii) is to com-
pare results obtained with complete data and those with data left-censored
at later periods. Sweden has full information available from 1751. Since
mortality improved there more in the period 1750–1880 than in the other
countries for which estimates exist—England and Wales (Wrigley and
Schofield 1981) and France (Vallin 1991)—Sweden provides a stringent
test. I compute the components of change in mean age between selected
years and 2014 using equation (2) and compare results using complete data
with those obtained if information was available only from 1850, 1900, and
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TABLE 3 Effect of censoring at 1850, 1900, and 1950 on aging decomposition
results to 2014, Sweden
Initial year
1850 1900 1950 1900 1950
Overall change in mean
age between initial year
and 2014
13.72 11.59 6.35 11.59 6.35
Difference (in years) of
complete and censored
values between initial
year and 2014 for: Censor year 1850
Censor year
1900
Birth cohort 1.70 0.28 0.00 2.46 1.13
Survival –1.82 –0.28 –0.02 –1.34 –0.43
Net migration 0.12 0.01 0.02 –1.11 –0.69
Mean absolute difference
of component values (in
years)
1.21 0.19 0.01 1.64 0.75
Mean absolute difference
as percent of overall
change
8.8 1.6 0.2 14.1 11.8
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of Human Mortality Database.
1950 (this last date being the same as that of Preston and Stokes (2012), who
used information from the UN database available from that date augmented
by occasional earlier estimates).
I present results in Figure 2 and Table 3. The observed overall mean
age increased by 13.7 years, from 27.5 to 41.2 years, over the period 1850–
2014 (solid line in Panel a). Errors due to using censored rather than com-
plete estimates in equation (1) are the differences between the open and
solid symbols for each of the three components. As one moves away from
the start date, the differences between the complete and censored values
become smaller since they must be identical from about 100 years ahead.
Errors in the individual components between a particular year and 2014 de-
pend on the degree of censoring of the data used. For example, the change
in the overall mean age between 1900 and 2014 is 11.6 years, of which 2.5
years is attributed to the birth cohort term using complete data (the same
complete values are presented in Figure 2, Panels a and b). The share at-
tributed to the birth cohort component over this period using data with a
censoring date of 1900 was 4.9 years (Panel b), or 2.5 years larger than the
complete value, whereas the value between 1900 and 2014 with a censor-
ing date of 1850 was only 0.3 years less (Panel a). The average absolute er-
ror across the three components for estimates between 1900 and 2014 using
data censored at 1850was only 0.2 years, or 1.6 percent of the total observed
change between 1900 and 2014 (Table 3). After about 50 years ahead, the
complete values and those with 1850 as the censoring year are essentially
the same. I attribute this to the fact that international migration levels were
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14 DEMOGRAPH IC DETERMINANTS OF POPULAT ION AG ING IN EUROPE SINCE 1850
much lower before the age of mass migration starting around 1850, with
substantial out-migration mainly to the US especially in the last quarter of
the nineteenth century, and to the limited improvements in mortality that
occurred before the mid-nineteenth century. Discrepancies increase with a
later censoring date and, unsurprisingly, are largest for the 1950 censor date
estimates, since the assumptions of zero net migration and fixed mortality
before 1950 for the previous 100 years are clearly inappropriate.
Both historical studies and calculations based on Swedish data suggest
that the biases involved in making the constant-mortality and no-migration
assumptions in the period before the first available year are likely to be rel-
atively small for all countries from 1900. I conclude that acceptable esti-
mates of the components of population aging can be produced throughout
the twentieth century.4
Inclusion of the direct effect of fertility
Equation (1) does not include an explicit measure of fertility, usually iden-
tified as the prime driver of population aging over the entire period covered
here. To separate out the fertility component, I decompose the birth cohort
term into the product of a fertility measure (births per individual), which
reflects current behavioral choices and constraints, and number of individ-
uals at risk, which depends on earlier fertility, mortality, and migration.
There are alternative ways of specifying the fertility measure, and the
choice is to some extent arbitrary. To assess the robustness of my approach,
I present two sets of estimates using the crude birth rate (CBR) and a gross
reproduction rate (GRR) measure based on the fertility estimation approach
described earlier. The crude birth rate is not independent of the population
age structure and is therefore not a “pure” fertility index with the direct
“children per woman” interpretation of an index such as TFR or GRR, but it
is simple, widely available, and forms one component of natural population
growth.
In general, the birth cohort term B(t) in equation (1) can be written as
the product of a fertility measure F(t) and the corresponding population at
risk at time t, R(t). (R(t) is thus defined as B(t)/F(t). If F is the CBR, the pop-
ulation at risk is the overall population size; for GRR, it is an appropriately
weighted average of individuals in fertile age groups.) With this decomposi-
tion, the birth cohort term on the right hand side of equation (2) is replaced
by two terms showing the separate effects of changes in fertility and in pop-
ulation at risk.
∂B (t − a)
∂t
/B (t − a) = ∂F (t − a)
∂t
/F (t − a) + ∂R (t − a)
∂t
/R (t − a)
This decomposition treats mortality and migration (of the current pop-
ulation) symmetrically with fertility (of the parental generation), and also
includes a population-at-risk term as a separate component. It therefore
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FIGURE 3 Decomposition of overall birth cohort component into CBR and
GRR fertility components
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of Human Mortality Database.
addresses one major difference between the original PHE and stable or pop-
ulation projection approaches, namely that the former has no explicit fertil-
ity term. The formulation is closer to the standard cohort component model
for which the sufficient statistics are baseline population size and structure,
together with fertility, mortality, and net migration rates. This formulation
is similar to that of Lee and Zhou (2017), who decompose births using TFR
rather than GRR or CBR, although they do not fit these enhanced models.
While mortality and migration are uniquely specified in equation (1),
alternative fertility measures may be used, so I consider how robust results
are to different choices. Figure 3 shows the birth cohort component of over-
all population change decomposed into two sets of fertility and population-
at-risk terms; Table 4 shows corresponding total and partial correlation
coefficients and variances of these series from 1900. For the overall Eu-
ropean series, the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.99 between the birth
cohort and CBR fertility series and 0.88 between birth cohort and GRR; the
partial correlation coefficients are around 0.99. These results confirm that
these series show similar underlying patterns.
The hatched areas of Figure 3 show the range of the contribution of
the two fertility measures and corresponding population-at-risk terms to
population aging and therefore indicate the sensitivity of results to these
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alternative choices (individual country values are available on request). The
GRR population-at-risk term is more variable than the CBR term since it
is based on a population averaged over a smaller age band than the total
population. The fertility rate series gives the direct effect of fertility, and
the population-at-risk series include the indirect effect of all other compo-
nents. The variability of the latter component is much smaller than the for-
mer (Table 4b) and therefore the birth cohort series is much more similar
to the fertility series than to the population-at-risk series. The two fertil-
ity series provide similar substantive results concerning the relative con-
tribution of the direct effect of fertility, mortality, and migration to pop-
ulation aging across these countries. I conclude that the separation of the
birth cohort term into these two components is robust to alternative fertility
specifications.
Components of population aging in Europe
1850–present: Final results
Having established that data availability from about 1850 is unlikely to affect
results from 1900 and that robust estimates of the direct fertility component
exist, I now present the final results.While generalized statements about the
determinants of population aging exist, the likelihood that their effects are
not constant across time and space has been advanced on both theoretical
and empirical grounds (Hermalin 1966). However, conclusions from the
published PHE studies to date relate to estimates based on short five-year
windows concentrated in periods around the end of the twentieth century
and so may not be typical of longer periods.
I start by discussing changes in the components of population mean
age averaged across the 11 European countries weighted by population size,
covering the majority of people living in Europe (excluding Eastern Eu-
rope). Although data are available only from 1850, this is not a major lim-
itation since changes in population aging appear to have been small before
that date and immediately thereafter. For example, the proportion aged 60
and over in England was 8 or 9 percent in the period 1541–1800 and about
6.6 percent in 1841, a value slightly lower than in earlier periods (Wrigley
and Schofield 1981, Table A.3.1), and there was very limited population
aging in the reminder of the nineteenth century (Figure 1). The overall
population mean age increased by only 0.6 years in the period 1850–1900,
but by 2.0 years in the following 25 years based on countries with avail-
able data as the effect of fertility decline began to exert itself (Coale and
Watkins 1986). I therefore discuss results only from 1900 (based on all avail-
able data) since earlier values are small and are based on an assumption of
earlier constant fertility and mortality, so that changes tend to be attributed
to the birth cohort component.
18 DEMOGRAPH IC DETERMINANTS OF POPULAT ION AG ING IN EUROPE SINCE 1850
Population mean age rose monotonically by 12.4 years between 1900
and 2012, with an increasing trend apart from a deceleration in 1950–75,
before rising even more rapidly in the period 1975–2012 (Table 5). I present
analyses based on dividing the birth cohort term in equation (1) into CBR
and total population components rather than the GRR measures, but re-
sults are similar in both cases. The fertility, mortality, and net migration
components exhibit different trends. Mortality improvement had little ef-
fect on population aging in the first part of the period. In fact, in the nine-
teenth century it made population average ages slightly younger rather than
older, as Coale and others noted. In later periods, mortality improvement
was monotonically associated with population aging, a process that acceler-
ated steadily over the twentieth century, especially from about mid-century
(Table 5). Over the whole period since 1900, mortality improvement ac-
counted for 66.2 percent of the increase in mean age, the great majority
occurring in the second half of the century.
Although the late nineteenth century was the age of mass emigra-
tion from Europe, and the late twentieth century might be characterized as
the age of mass immigration, the overall long-term direct effect of migra-
tion on population structure to date is minimal.5 However, migration had
some role in reducing aging in the early twentieth century in both Swe-
den and France, but the reasons were different. In Sweden, older cohorts
were “hollowed out” by earlier emigration, whereas contemporary inflows
of younger people in France led to a shift toward younger average ages. In
general, migration had little effect on population aging, neither accelerat-
ing nor retarding it over the period. However, its direct effect will acceler-
ate population aging in the twenty-first century if net migration does not
continue the increasing trend of recent periods.
The role of birth cohort size, in contrast, is larger and more complex.
Changes in this series are more similar to those in the fertility rates than
in the population-at-risk series, so the following comments relate to both
fertility and birth cohort series. In the period up to 1945, fertility was by
far the most important factor in population aging. However, the sharp in-
crease in births in many European countries for several decades following
1945 meant that fertility trends tended to make populations younger rather
than older, although this trend was not sufficient to completely offset the
increasing influence of mortality improvement. In the three decades fol-
lowing 1945, fertility/birth cohort effects substantially retarded population
aging in Europe, before the pattern reversed in recent decades and for the
first time fertility andmortality act strongly together to reinforce population
aging.
While the terms in equation (1) relate directly to specific compo-
nents of population change over time, the population at risk underlying
equation (3) is ill-defined. It combines earlier fertility, mortality, and mi-
gration experiences in a way that does not permit these components to be
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separately identified. The population-at-risk term can be taken to represent
the unattributed component of population aging and may be interpreted as
the residual after the direct effect of the other components has been esti-
mated. The effect has been small over the whole period, accounting for 0.8
years out of a total change of just over 12 years, a magnitude similar to that
for net migration.
Increases in population aging in the period up to 1950 were driven
largely by fertility decline (Table 5). From the middle of the twentieth cen-
tury, direct mortality effects start to dominate, with birth cohort effects be-
coming negligible since annual births were relatively constant as compared
with earlier periods. These findings are consistent with the conventional de-
piction of trends in population aging as set out in the introduction, although
the key role of the postwar baby boom driven by fertility increase has re-
ceived less attention. The sharp reduction in population aging due to birth
cohort effects in the postwar period is inconsistent with the simplified de-
mographic transition model. The reason is that the postwar baby boom led
to larger numbers of births in this period, and infants have the largest influ-
ence on attenuating population aging since they are the maximum possible
distance below the mean age. It is clear from Table 5 that the baby boom
was primarily due to increased fertility over the period rather than to larger
populations at risk. While the main discussion about different patterns of
population aging between high-income and middle- or low-income coun-
tries has been concerned with the different pace of aging, the baby boom
represents an additional factor, which will continue to play a key role in
population aging for decades to come. Most discussion about the relative
effect of fertility and mortality on population aging has compared mono-
tonic fertility and mortality decline. However, a rise followed by a sharp
fall in fertility will lead initially to a deceleration in population aging, fol-
lowed by an increase as these large cohorts move into age groups above the
population mean age (although this effect may be offset by the additional
offspring that they may contribute to younger generations). The full effects
will become apparent over long time-scales, a fact that demonstrates the
importance of the choice of period analyzed.
The question remains of how far these trends reflect a common pat-
tern across these European countries or a range of distinct patterns. Much
analysis has been based on a framework of progression toward a regime of
low fertility and mortality, albeit occurring with different lags (Coale and
Watkins 1986). However, the heterogeneity of experience must be recog-
nized, especially in relation to trends in population aging (Figure 4). The
reason fertility has been emphasized as a determinant of population aging
is that it alters age-specific population growth and therefore the relative
number of young to old people. Changes in population growth rates might
be expected to have a strong effect on population aging. Growth has varied
substantially and there is a general tendency for countries that have grown
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FIGURE 5 Relationship of population growth and change in mean age
between initial and final year
SOURCE: Author’s analysis of Human Mortality Database.
most to have the lowest levels of population aging (Figure5). Most coun-
tries grew between a factor of two and four over the period 1850 (or first
available year if later) to the present. On average, this corresponds to an
expected change of about 13 years in mean age over the period. This is not
inevitable, however: at the extremes of the growth distribution, since 1850
France grew by only 80 percent, whereas the Netherlands grew by 450 per-
cent, but mean age actually increased less in France than the Netherlands,
the opposite of what might have been expected.
Summary and conclusion
Mean age has advantages as an indicator of population aging. It is the nat-
ural statistic for modeling the components of population dynamics.6 How-
ever, the relative importance of fertility and mortality for population aging
is unrelated to the choice of index of aging.
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Approaches using population projections might appear to be more
straightforward, and the data required are both more readily available and
sometimes considerably less substantial. Nevertheless, results with this ap-
proach require a number of decisions for which there is no obvious ratio-
nale. Some analyses are based on projections with counterfactual assump-
tions from a given time point and a comparison with actual outcomes from
that date (for example, Hermalin 1966). Other approaches apply their as-
sumptions for long periods of time before comparing the results and ac-
tual values. Lee and Zhao (2017) apply the alternative assumptions for
a century before examining differences in population aging over a five-
year period. This latter approach is more consistent with the PHE model,
but also requires information for about a century before comparisons are
available.
Amodel like PHE appears to havemajor advantages for elucidating the
process of population aging compared with alternative methods, for reasons
set out earlier. Some of the concerns about the interpretation of results from
the PHE approach may turn out to be less important with these additional
findings. The analysis presented here tracks the determinants of population
aging in 11 European countries for well over a century, including over the
period of demographic transition relevant to population aging.7 The PHE
approach provides an interpretation of aging trends using explicit outputs
as opposed to subjective criteria—apart from the choice of fertility indicator,
which appears to have little influence. In the most recent period, mortality
is the dominant determinant of population aging, and since 1950 fertility
and birth cohort size have no effect on population aging other than a slight
inhibiting effect. This statement could be qualified by inserting “direct” in
front of determinants, but I have shown that the unallocated (indirect) com-
ponent is small and does not affect the main conclusions about the relative
importance of fertility and mortality over this period. This approach also
provides precise estimates of timing, identifying the period 1945–50 as a
key moment when mortality overtook fertility as the driver of population
aging in Europe, a position it seems unlikely to relinquish in the foreseeable
future.
The finding that mortality improvement has had a dominant role in
population aging in these European countries since the middle of the twen-
tieth century is not surprising, given that fertility had been relatively low
for the whole lifetime of those now alive. In Britain, the total fertility rate
is almost the same as it was nearly a century ago, 1.9 in 2010 compared
with 2.0 in 1926–30 (OPCS 1987; Office for National Statistics 2015). The
contribution of fertility change to population aging in Europe was confined
largely to changes in a period of a couple of decades around the start of the
twentieth century. Like the tortoise and the hare, the steady improvement
in mortality eventually overwhelms the volatile fertility component. We
also note that the contribution of net migration to population aging was
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both small and transient (although over this period, its main component
was often emigration rather than immigration).
These results also provide a clearer chronology for the development
of population aging. We can identify the point at which mortality replaces
fertility as a primary determinant of population aging as just after the end
of World War II. The importance of the postwar baby boom in these soci-
eties is also noteworthy. These results confirm the initial pre-eminent role
of fertility being superseded by mortality in these high-income countries, a
pattern that will plausibly be followed by low- and middle-income coun-
tries in due course. I emphasize that these results are specific to Europe and
possibly to some other high-income countries, although in the initial period
covered by the analysis they were at an early stage of demographic transi-
tion. However, the much more rapid and substantial reduction in fertility
in a country such as China, where the total fertility rate fell from 6.3 to
1.5 in a generation between in 1965–70 and 1995–2000, produces a shock
wave that will propagate for a century or more into the future, with major
socio-demographic implications (United Nations Department of Economic
and Social Affairs 2015). The postwar baby boom in the West, which re-
tarded population aging and eased the inevitable aging transition, was a
luxury that will not be available to such emerging economies.
While population aging has moved to the top of the social, economic,
and political agenda in much of the world, the mechanisms underpinning
it—in particular, the relative long-term contributions of fertility, mortality,
and migration—remain unclear. I have attempted to show how the process
unfolded over an extended time period in a single continent using a partic-
ular decomposition approach. The results are broadly similar to those based
on other approaches, but suggest that the role of mortality improvement
has attracted less attention than it deserves.
Notes
Thanks are due to the University of
California, Berkeley and the Max Planck In-
stitute for Demographic Research for access
to the Human Mortality Database (http://
www.mortality.org/cgi-bin/hmd/DataAvaila
bility.php), and to the statistical offices in
England and Wales and in Scotland for pro-
vision of original data (http://www.mortality.
org/hmd/GBR_SCO/DOCS/ref.pdf).
1 Counterfactual projections, which
conventionally fix fertility or mortality at
an initial value and compare projection re-
sults with later actual values, are sometimes
used to identify the contributions of fertility
and mortality to population aging. However,
this approach fails to provide useful informa-
tion over the extended time scales such as
those considered here. If the effect of fertility
change on population structure is assessed
by a projection with fertility fixed at around
1850 levels, the projected population would
be about eight times larger than the actual
population by 2015 and it would have a very
young age structure. On the other hand, if
mortality is fixed at 1850 levels, the projected
population would be about one quarter of
the actual size. Thus conclusions are based
on comparisons of actual with unrealistic
projections. With shorter projection periods,
an additional problem is that the results can
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be very sensitive to choice of the starting
date. For example, if such an exercise were
undertaken over a period of about 40 years in
Britain starting from the mid-1960s, baseline
fertility (TFR in England and Wales of 2.93
in 1964) was much higher than the average
over the next four decades. The current ob-
served population structure would be consid-
erably older than the projected population,
leading to the interpretation that fertility
change in recent decades had made the pop-
ulation older. On the other hand, if the same
analysis had been started 30 rather than 40
years ago (TFR 1.66 in 1977, thus lower than
the average over the subsequent period), the
actual population would be younger than the
projected one, and the interpretation would
be that fertility change in that period had
made the population younger.
2 These points had been emphasized by
Horiuchi (1991, p. 42): “It is important to dis-
tinguish direct and indirect effects of mor-
tality changes on population growth. The
present method [using age-specific growth
rates r(a,t)] is concerned with direct mortality
effects only. Mortality reduction, however,
has some indirect effects. … Such indirect
mortality effects working through fertility are
difficult to assess when the present method is
adopted.” Preston and Stokes (2012, p. 224)
noted that: “The answer supplied by this ac-
counting approach [PHE model] is not nec-
essarily the same as what would be supplied
by models or by counterfactual simulations.”
Lee and Zhou (2017) compare counterfactual
population projections based on constant fer-
tility and/or mortality from 1900 with ac-
tual values in India and the more developed
countries (MDCs) over the period 2005–10,
the period chosen for direct comparison with
the findings of Preston and Stokes (2012),
to identify the determinants of population
aging. They show that with this model, fer-
tility decline was the main factor in pop-
ulation aging. This is consistent with the
findings of Bengtsson and Scott (2010) for
Sweden over the same period and with the
conventional explanation as summarized by
Wilmoth (2015). There appear to be differ-
ent answers to what is apparently the same
question: what is the relative contribution
of fertility and mortality to contemporary
population aging? Since this issue is closely
tied to the allocation between direct and
indirect pathways, I consider this issue in
more detail.
3 Apart from, for example, decisions
about how to implement a formal model
based on continuous function formulation
when data are available only in discrete form.
This means that there are some minor dis-
crepancies between the change in observed
mean age and the sum of the individual com-
ponents, but these are substantively unim-
portant. There may also be decisions about
how the requirement for a 100-year lead-
in period may be relaxed as done by Pre-
ston and Stokes (2012), who devote consid-
erable attention to this issue since they use
United Nations data available only from
1950.
4 However, assumptions of constant
mortality and zero migration before the first
available year produce estimates that are bi-
ased toward zero before 1900. Constant age-
specific mortality and migration before the
start date means that the first derivatives of
the corresponding terms in equation (2) are
constrained to be zero at the start date. In
addition, one must recognize the possibility
of imprecision for data close to the initial
year in estimates of net migration based on
the difference between overall and natural
population change. However, since popula-
tion aging was limited or even absent in the
nineteenth century, differences between esti-
mates to the present starting in 1850 or 1900
are likely to be small. Biases become larger
for start years in the twentieth century, both
because population aging had started and be-
cause the preceding demographic regimewas
changing substantially. This suggests that es-
timates in such cases will require a longer
lead-in time or further adjustment. To the ex-
tent thatmortality andmigration trendswere
less marked in developing countries in the
twentieth century, these findings should not
be regarded as invalidating their use in such
contexts, although more detailed approaches
such as those of Preston and Stokes (2012)
may be necessary.
5 Note that the migration component
includes only the contribution of first-
generation migrants. As with the indirect
effect of mortality, their descendants are clas-
sified as native-born children who there-
fore contribute to the birth cohort term.
26 DEMOGRAPH IC DETERMINANTS OF POPULAT ION AG ING IN EUROPE SINCE 1850
For discussion of models that estimate the
long-term implications of migration on pop-
ulation size and structure, see Murphy
(2016a).
6 While not discussed here, the same
approach can be confined to sub-populations
to investigate, for example, aging within the
older population, or separately for men and
women or for different socio-demographic
groups.
7 This excludes the first half of the nine-
teenth century (Lee 2003), but there was lit-
tle sign of population aging until well after
1850.
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